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WILLS-TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO THE CORPUS OF AN
INTER VIVOS TRUST-RECENT JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS-The shape of the law relating to testamentary additions
to the corpus of an inter vivos trust was outlined in 1951 by
Professor George E. Palmer in an article entitled "Testamentary
Dispositions to the Trustee of an Inter Vivos Trust." 1 It is the
purpose of this comment to consider recent developments in this
area. A generalized formulation of the problem to be dealt with
is-may a valid bequest be made to the trustee of an inter vivos
trust without setting out the terms of the trust in the will?

Recent Judicial Developments

A. Where the Trust Is Unamendable and Irrevocable. If the
inter vivos trust created was neither amendable nor revocable,
Professor Palmer determined that a valid bequest to its corpus
could be made in most jurisdictions without repeating the terms
of the trust in the -will,2 either by resort to the doctrine of incorporation by reference 3 or the rule "that meaning can be given
to ... [a] will by reference to facts having 'independent' or 'nontestamentary' significance."4 There are no current decisions adopting a contrary view.

150 MICH. L. REv. 33 (1951). Citations to Professor Palmer's article will hereinafter
be made in the following form: "Palmer, p. 33."
2 Palmer, p. 33.
3Ibid.
4 Palmer, p. 34. See also TRUSTS RESTATEMENT SECOND, Tent. Draft No. 2, §54(g) (1955).
The Restatement of Trusts Second was approved and adopted by the A.L.I. in 1957.
See 34th Annual Meeting, The American Law Institute, Proceedings, p. 279.
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B. Where the Trust Is Amendable or Revocable but Is Not
Altered Subsequent to the Execution of the Will. Where a bequest is made to the corpus of an amendable trust without repeating its terms in the will, Professor Palmer concluded that:
"Apart from the opinions of able writers the authority supporting ... [this type] of bequest is not impressive." 5 The decisions
invalidating such bequests purport to do so in the name of the
statute of wills on the theory that a "testator cannot by his will
prospectively create for himself a power to dispose of this property
by an instrument not duly executed as a will or codicil.'' 6 Palmer
rejected this generalization as a statement of the controlling
rule of law, and noted a number of distinctions presented by the
cases which must now be discussed.
(1) Where the power to amend is restated in the will v. where
the fact that the trust is amendable appears only in the trust instrument. An English case, Matter of I ones,1 invalidated a bequest to the trustee of an amendable inter vivos trust, where the
power to amend was restated in the will. The decision rested
on the inability of the court to receive evidence which would
enable it to ascertain whether or not any alterations of the trust
instrument had been made by the testator subsequent to the execution of his will. The decision was criticized by Palmer.8 Another
English case, In re Edwards' Will,9 in which there was no indication in the will that the trust was amendable, recognized that
a bequest to the corpus of an amendable inter vivos trust could
be upheld on an incorporation by reference theory. 10 These two
English decisions have been harmonized by In re Schintz Will 11
under the rule that where the power to amend the inter vivos trust
is referred to in the will itself the bequest is bad; but a power to
amend the trust which is not referred to in the will does not invalidate the bequest. A new distinction was drawn in the Schintz
case, however. The bequest there was made, for the benefit of
the testator's daughter, Julia, to the trustee of the inter vivos trust

Palmer, p. 45.
Atwood v. 'Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., (1st Cir. 1921) 275 F. 513 at 521. See
also criticism by Palmer, pp. 38, 42.
7 [1942] Ch. 328, I All E. R. 642.
8 Palmer, p. 41.
9 [1948] Ch. 440.
10 See Palmer, p. 42.
11 [1951] Ch. 870.
5

6
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to be held in the same manner as Julia's share in the trust or
upon such deed or deeds "(if any) which may hereafter be
executed by me under the power of revocation and declaration
of new trusts thereby reserved to me or as near thereto as circumstances will admit." 12 The court upheld the bequest even
though the power to amend the trust was referred to in the will,
on the theory that the power in the will was not intended to be
operative, but rather merely descriptive of the terms of the trust.
The language in Schintz is susceptible of this interpretation. The
decision is encouraging in that it will tend to limit the application
of the Jones rule.
The American cases evidently have not differentiated between
the situations where the power to amend is restated in the will and
where it appears only in the trust instrument. A will employing
the language, "I hereby make the following disposition of my
real and personal effects in accordance with the attached list of
assets (made current by subsequent lists)" was upheld in In re
Protheroe's Estate 13 on an incorporation by reference theory without discussion of the fact that the power to amend appeared in the
will itself. Of course the case did not deal with a bequest to an
inter vivos trust and might be distinguished by some courts on
this basis.14 In Clark v. Citizens National Bank a bequest to be
held in accordance with the terms of an inter vivos charitable
trust ". . . including such amendments to and modifications of
the same, if any, as may hereafter and during my lifetime be
made ... " was held invalid,15 but on the ground that the prerequisites for incorporation by reference and independent significance were not met. By implication of the court's analysis, the
mere reservation in the will of the power to amend the trust did
not defeat the bequest.
(2) Where the testator intends the property disposed of by
his will to pass in accordance with the terms of the trust as they
appeared when the will was executed, even though the trust may
in fact be subsequently amended v. where the testator intends
the property disposed of by his will to be governed by the terms
of amendments to the trust which may be made after the execu12 Id. at 871.
13 (S.D. 1957) 85 N.W.
14 See Clark v. Citizens

108 (1955).
15 Id. at 73, 74.

(2d) 505 at 507.
Nat. Bank of Collingswood, 38 N.J. Super. 69, 118 A. (2d)
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tion of the will. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland16 was a case
in which a bequest was upheld on the ground that the testator
did not intend subsequent amendments to the trust to affect
the disposition of property under his will. 17 Professor Palmer
equated this type of situation with one involving an unamendable
trust and would apply the same rules to both.18 In a recent New
York case, however, where the will provided " ... I do not intend
to incorporate in this my Last Will and Testament any future
amendments which I may make to said Agreement [the inter vivos
trust] ... ,"19 the court distinguished President and Directors of
the Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz20 and upheld the bequest on the
broader ground that an amendable trust may be incorporated by
reference into a will if in fact no amendments are made subsequent to the execution of the will.21 Query as to what decision
the court would have reached had later amendments in fact been
made in view of the express disclaimer by the testator of an intent
to include them. 22
Since 1951 a number of courts have upheld bequests to the
trustee of an amendable but unamended inter vivos trust, even
though it is determined that the testator intended the property
passing by will at his death to be governed by the terms of any
amendments to the trust made after the execution of the will. 23
Although perhaps distinguishable, Montgomery v. Blankenship,24
upholding a bequest incorporating a trust instrument where the

. 16 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935).
17 See Palmer, p. 45.
1s Ibid.
19 In re Snyder's Will, 125 N.Y.S. (2d) 459 at 460 (1953).
20260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S. (2d) 232 (1940), where an amendment to the trust
made subsequent to the execution of the will was held to have caused complete invalidity
of the bequest. Discussed by Palmer at pp. 53, 61.
21 Two alternative grounds for upholding the bequest were available to the court.
It could have adopted the approach of Old Colony Trust Co. and treated the trust
instrument as one not subject to modification or, as it chose to do, distinguished the
Janowitz case on the ground that the trust instrument was not in fact amended subsequent
to the e.xecution of the will.
22 It might be argued that the court's failure to adopt the theory of the Old Colony
Trust Co. case in a situation where it was so clearly available was an implied rejection of
that theory.
23 Forsythe v. Spielberger, (Fla. 1956) 86 S. (2d) 427; Stouse v. First Nat. Bank of
Chicago, (Ky. 1951) 245 S.W. (2d) 914; In re Ivie's Will, 155 N.Y.S. (2d) 544 (1956), affd.
3 App. Div. (2d) 914, 163 N.Y.S. (2d) 380 (1957), affd. 4 N.Y. (2d) 178, 173 N.Y.S. (2d) 293
(1958); State of Indiana ex rel. Citizens Nat. Bank v. Superior Court of Madison County.
(Ind. 1956) 138 N.E. (2d) 900. See also cases cited ·by Palmer, pp. 45, 46.
24 217 Ark. 357, 239 S.W. (2d) 758 (1950).
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trust was assumed to be invalid, and In re Protheroe's Estate,25
recognizing the validity of a bequest incorporating an amendable
·writing which was not a trust instrument, also support the above
proposition. There are no contrary decisions among the recent
cases.
The Illinois court in Continental Illinois National Bank v.
Art Institute 26 sustained a bequest of the residuum of the testator's
estate to the trustee of an inter vivos trust. The will made reference
to the trust instrument and certain amendments thereto, but the
importance of the decision as a precedent is lessened by the court's
failure to address itself to the problems associated with incorporation of an amendable trust.
A New York lower court decision, In re Snyder's Will,21 has upheld a bequest to an amendable inter vivos trust on the broad
ground that mere reservation of a power to amend, if not exercised,
will not invalidate the disposition. The will expressly disclaimed
any intent to incorporate later amendments, however, though the
court failed to discuss this aspect of the case.
In an interesting New Jersey decision28 dealing with the effect
of a bequest of the testator's residuary estate to the trustee of an
inter vivos trust for charitable purposes, the court found that the
res of the trust had not been delivered until after the date of execution of the will, concluded that no trust was in existence at the
time of the execution of the will, and decided, "It is unnecessary to
here conclude whether the doctrine of incorporation by reference
has been adopted or rejected in New Jersey, since in any event
one of the essential elements is lacking, i.e., the existence of a
valid trust on the date of the execution of the will." It was assumed throughout the opinion that the trust instrument was in existence at the time the will was executed. This would have been
sufficient ground to sustain the bequest in the majority of jurisdictions which accept the incorporation by reference doctrine,
as it is generally recognized that it is the trust instrument and not
the trust itself which is incorporated into the will. 29 The court

25 (S.D. 1957) 85 N.W. (2d) 505.
26409 Ill. 481,100 N.E. (2d) 625 (1951).
21125 N.Y.S. (2d) 459 (1953).
28 Clark v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Collingswood, 38 N.J. Super. 69 at 78, 80, II8 A.
(2d) 108 (1955). The case is criticized in l Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §54.3, pp. 16, 17 (1956;
Supp. 1958).
29 Palmer, pp. 39, 40, 42, 55.
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went on to state: "In the matter sub judice resort is sought to the
inter vivos trust in order to ascertain the disposition of the property, the terms of the bequest. The testator attempted to dispose
of his residue by a non-testamentary instrument. Such a gift is
invalid, as the trust agreement has no independent significance,
as above defined." The court's analysis on this issue, although consistent with the state of authorities, points up the failure of current legal opinion to achieve an integrated approach in the application of the doctrine of independent significance to different types
of factual situations. Even though the doctrine is accepted in a
particular jurisdiction, the court must still decide at what time
the independent significance of a given act is to be tested. A
majority of courts require that the trust instrument have independent significance at the time the will is executed (which
means the trust must be in existence at this time), although this is
not a limitation imposed in connection with application of the
doctrine to acts which do not concern the creation or amendment
of a trust. 30 Professor Palmer has suggested that the inconsistency
results from the failure of the courts to divorce methods of analysis
based on the doctrine of incorporation by reference, which requires an existing trust instrument, from analysis based on independent significance, and that courts carry over limitations from
the former to the latter.31
C. Where the Trust Was in Fact Amended or Revoked Subsequent to the Execution of the Will. The effect of a subsequent
amendment or revocation is not important if the mere reservation of the power to amend or revoke is held to invalidate the bequest. Nor should the amendment be important if the court
in construing the will finds that the testator intended the property
to pass in accordance with the terms of the original trust instrument.32 But where the court finds that the testator intended the

ao For example, a bequest to "the persons in my employ at my death," or "to the
person who is my wife at my death" would not be invalidated for want of independent
significance even though the employment relationship or the marriage was not created
until after the execution of the will. See Palmer, p. 35. See also the illustrations cited
by the TRUSTS RESTATEMENT SECOND, Tent. Draft No. 2, §54(d) 3, 4, 5 (1955),' and the
discussion of the Restatement •view in the text infra.
31 Palmer, p. 55. See also TRUSTS RESTATEMENT SECOND, Tent. Draft No. 2, §54(f)
(1955), recognizing that resort to facts existing after the execution of the will is possible
in certain pour-over trust situations under the doctrine of independent significance, and
see discussion of the Restatement view in the text infra.
32 Palmer, p. 51. But see note 22 supra.
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property to pass by the terms of the trust instrument in the form
it took at his death, and where the reservation of a power to amend
does not defeat the bequest, additional problems are raised. It
becomes necessary for a court to see the distinction between situations in which it is possible to give effect to an amendment by
treating it as applicable to the corpus of the inter vivos trust only,
as for example, a gift of a specific sum of money which can be
satisfied out of the trust corpus, and situations in which the amendment must be related to the property passing by the will in order
to be given effect, e.g., a gift of land owned by the testator at
death or a bequest to be distributed in the same proportions as
the percentage shares held by the beneficiaries of the trust. 33
Amendments of the former type should be upheld and should not
invalidate the bequest in any jurisdiction which will sustain a bequest to the trustee of an amendable inter vivos trust. 34 In re Ivie's
Will 35 is a recent decision which lends some support to this
conclusion.
With respect to amendments to the trust which are meant
to operate in relation to property owned at death, there are three
alternatives: (1) uphold the bequest in accordance with the terms
of the trust as amended, (2) uphold the bequest in accordance
with the terms of the trust as they existed at the time of the execution of the will, (3) invalidate the entire bequest.36 In the first
edition of his treatise on Trusts, Professor Scott advocated giving
effect to later amendments, but if this was rejected he preferred
complete invalidity to upholding the bequest in accordance with
the terms of the trust as they appeared at the time of execution
of the will.37 In his recent second edition Professor Scott has concluded that giving effect to the bequest in accordance with the
terms of the trust as they existed when the will was executed more
closely approximates the testator's wishes in the typical case than
complete invalidity of the bequest, and therefore reversed himself

aa Palmer, pp. 52, 53.
34 Palmer, p. 53.
·
315155 N.Y.S. (2d) 544 (1956). See discussion of this case in text infra.
36 Palmer, pp. 53, 54.
37 I Scorr, TRUSTS 299 (1939). Professor Palmer also advocates giving effect to later
amendments which have in fact some independent significance, and agrees with the
position now taken by Professor Scott in the second edition of his treatise should the
courts refuse to give effect to the subsequent amendments. See Palmer, pp. 54, 59, 60,
and note 38 infra.
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as to the more desirable alternative should his preferred view be
rejected by the courts. 38 The recently adopted revision of the
American Law Institute's Restatement of Trusts, in applying the
doctrine of independent significance, takes the position that amendments to the trust made after the execution of the will are gener- ·
ally effective. 39 This view is subject to the criticism that it may not
provide the courts with a sufficiently flexible approach to the
problems which confront them. No court has yet expressed a
willingness to give effect to a bequest in accordance with the terms
of later amendments to the trust, 40 and the Restatement fails to
suggest an alternate solution should the courts refuse to give effect
to later amendments.41 Furthermore, although recognizing that
the doctrine of independent significance can apply to facts which
come into existence after the will is executed, the Restatement
rigidly limits its application with respect to such later facts to those
which have independent significance at the time of the death of
the testator. According to the Restatement view the doctrine of
independent significance can apply in the context of the pourover trust problem only to facts which have such significance either
when the will is executed or at the death of the testator. 42 This
requires the existence of a valid trust at one of these two points

38 I Scorr, TRusrs, 2d ed., §54.3, p. 377 (1956). If the independent significance of the
trust amendment in any particular case is not sufficient to require that it be given dispositive effect, it is doubtful that it can be used in arriving at a quantitative determination whether the testator would -have in fact preferred complete invalidity of the bequest
as opposed to allowing the willed property to pass in accor_dance with the terms of the
trust as they appeared when his will was executed. "The legal objection is that the
provisions of an unattested writing . . . [cannot be] used in construing the will. • . •"
Palmer, p. 64.
39 TRUSIS R.EsTATEMENT SECOND, Tent. Draft No. 2, §54(i) (1955). The Restatement
of Trusts Second was approved and adopted by the A.L.I. in 1957. See 34th Annual
Meeting, The American Law Institute, Proceedings, p. 279.
40 See note 44 infra.
41 However, where the bequest fails because, for example, there is no property included in the trust at the testator's death, the Restatement suggests that later amendments
may be excluded and the bequest be given effect in accordance with the terms of the trust
as they appeared when the will was executed. See TRusrs RESIATEMENT SECOND, Tent.
Draft No. 2, §54(i), illus. 9 (1955).
42 Id., §54(i), and especially illus. 9. The reporter takes the position that where the
testator manifests an intent " . . . that the property bequeathed should be held upon
the terms of the trust as they were at the time of the execution of the will, . . ." the
doctrine of independent significance can be utilized to uphold the bequest if the trust
was in existence when the will was executed. Where the testator manifests an intent
" ... that the property bequeathed should be held upon the terms of •the trust as they
should be at the time of his death, ..." the reporter again recognizes that the bequest
can be upheld by utilizing the doctrine of independent significance, provided that the
trust was in existence at the time of the testator's death.
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of time: when the will is executed if the testator does not intend his
will to operate in accordance with later trust amendments; at the
death of the testator if he intends the property disposed of by his
will to go in accordance with later amendments to the trust. But
the theory underlying this doctrine requires no such limitation.
For example, a testator can bequeath property to persons now in
his employ; to persons who will be in his employ at his death; or
to persons who will be in his employ one year from the date of
execution of his will. The time at which the independent significance of a fact must be assessed cannot be arbitrarily established;
it must be gleaned from the will itself. No doubt the testator usually intends his will to speak as of the time of execution or at
the time of his death, but he is not limited to these two points of
time. Suppose that a testator executes a will making a bequest
to an amendable inter vivas trust which he intends to create at
some future date, and expresses an intent that amendments to the
trust are not to affect the dispositions made by his will; or suppose that a testator makes a bequest to an existing amendable inter
vivas trust and indicates that his will is to operate in accordance
with any trust amendments and is not to be affected by a later
revocation of the trust. If amendments are made to the trust in
the first case, or if the trust is amended and then revoked in the
second hypothetical situation, the doctrine of independent significance as it is espoused by the Restatement could not be used to
give effect to the testator's intent.43 A testator should be able to accomplish either of these results, and the doctrine of independent
significance should be stated broadly enough to accommodate his
needs. The Restatement view limiting the application of the doctrine to situations in which the trust was in existence at the time
of the execution of the will or at the time of the death of the testator is an unwarranted restriction of its usefulness.

43 With respect to the first hypothetical, the trust was not in existence when the
will was executed and therefore had no independent significance at this point of time.
Assuming it is in existence at the testator's death it has independent significance at this
point, but only in its amended form. With respect to the second hypothetical, if the
trust was in existence when the will was executed it had independent significance at this
point, ,but it was not in existence at the death of the testator and therefore has no
independent significance in its amended form. See TRUSTS RESTATEMENT SECOND, Tent.
Draft No. 2, §54(i) and (j). The reporter recognizes that the principle underlying the
rule of dependent relative revocation may be invoked to give effect to the bequest in
the first hypothetical in accordance with the terms of the trust as they appeared at the
testator's death, or in the second hypothetical in accordance with the terms of •the trust
as they appeared when the will was executed. See id., §54(i), illus. 9.
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The cases dealing with amendments meant to operate in relation to property owned at death are few, but no court at common
law has given effect to a bequest in accordance with the terms
of such an amendment to an inter vivos trust where the amendment was made after the will was executed. 44 With respect to
the second and third alternatives mentioned above, the little
available authority is in conflict.45 None of the recent decisions
deal directly with this problem. Amendments made subsequent to
the execution of the will, but drawn in accordance with the statute
of wills, were given effect in Stouse v. First National Bank of
Chicago. 46 In dictum the court observed that subsequent amendments not executed in accordance with the formalities required
by the statute of wills would be disregarded and that the estate
would pass by the terms of the trust instrument as they appeared
at the time of execution of the will. The court in In re Ivie's Will 41
gave effect to subsequent amendments which concerned only the
administration of the trust. It distinguished amendments of this
type from amendments which are testamentary in nature and in
dictum stated that the bequest is invalid if amendments of the
latter type are made. The decision could be classified with those
cases holding it possible to give effect to the amendment by treating
it as an amendment of the trust alone. An amendment to an inter
vivos trust was given effect as a part of the will in Forsythe v. Spielberger,48 but on a pleading technicality. The complaint failed
to allege that it was executed subsequent to the will and not in accordance with the requirements of the statute of wills. In dictum
the court in Montgomery v. Blankenship49 stated that it would
disregard subsequent amendments and give effect "to the provisions of the trust as they existed at the time of execution of the
will." Also in dictum, the court in In re Snyder's Will 50 stated
that amendment of the trust subsequent to the execution of the

44 In 1951 Professor Palmer found no decision giving effect, in accordance with the
terms of a trust amendment made after the execution of the will, to a disposition which
operated in relation to property owned by the testator at death (Palmer, p. 54), and none
has been located among the recent cases.
45 Palmer, p. 61.
46 (Ky. 1951) 245 S.W. (2d) 914.
47 155 N.Y.S. (2d) 544 (1956), affd. 3 App. Div. (2d) 914, 163 N.Y.S. (2d) 380 (1957),
affd. 4 N.Y. (2d) 178, 173 -N.Y.S. (2d) 293 (1958).
48 (Fla. 1956) 86 S. (2d) 427.
49 217 Ark. 357, 239 S.W. (2d) 758 (1950).
50 125 N.Y.S. (2d) 459 (1953).
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will would invalidate the bequest. The same result can be implied
from dictum in In re Protheroe's Estate. 51

Recent Statutes
Legislation dealing with testamentary additions to the corpus
of an inter vivas trust has been enacted in ten states. 52 The forerunner of these statutes was the Indiana act of 1953. Its influence
can be seen in the form and language of the Illinois and North
Carolina statutes which followed almost simultaneously in 1955,
and which served as the basic prototypes for most of the subsequent
legislation. The Nebraska statute, in the main, is a composite of the
terms of the Illinois and North Carolina statutes; many of the
provisions of the Pennsylvania statute have been taken from the
North Carolina act, and the Mississippi statute to a large extent
consists of provisions taken from the North Carolina and Illinois
statutes. The Wyoming statute is a verbatim enactment of the
Illinois statute. Wisconsin has adopted a different approach and
its legislation in form is unrelated to the other statutes. The
Connecticut and Oregon statutes are largely outside the main
current of the liberalizing trend which runs through the legislation of the other states and in most instances will be treated
separately. 53
These statutes will be discussed in relation to their bearing
upon the problems existing at common law, their prerequisites
for applicability, and the new doubts and uncertainties introduced
by the statutes themselves.
A. Scope of Applicability-Unamendable, Amendable, and Revocable Trusts. The Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi,
Nebraska, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Wyoming statutes all apply to unamendable, amendable, and revocable
trusts. If the statutory prerequisites for applicability are met it
is possible under these statutes to make a valid bequest to an inter
vivos trust, whether or not such trust is amendable or revocable,
51 (S.D. 1957) 85 N.W.
52 Connecticut, Illinois,

(2d) 505.
Indiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and ·wyoming. The text of each of these statutes is set out in
full in the Appendix, infra. Compare the provisions of the Illinois and North Carolina
statutes with the legislation suggested by Palmer, pp. 67-68.
53 The Connecticut statute, although conservative when compared to the legislation
of other states, should be read in the light of the rejection by the Connecticut courts
of the doctrines of independent significance and incorporation by reference. See Hatheway
v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 65 A. 1058 (1907).
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without repeating the trust terms in the will. The Oregon enactment provides that a "bequest shall not be invalid because the trust
is amendable," but the substantive rules established by the statute
probably will also be held to apply to trusts where a power of revocation is reserved, either by interpreting the statutory language
to be broad enough to comprehend such a power, 54 or by analogizing with the literal statutory language on the basis of legislative
policy. 55
B. Statutory Prerequisites for Applicability. A written trust
instrument, in existence at the time the will is "executed," and
identified in the will, are express prerequisites for applicability
of the Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Wyoming statutes. 56
North Carolina and Oregon require an existing written instrument, but do not provide that it must be identified in the will. 57
To the extent that the application of these statutes depends upon
an existing written trust instrument referred to in the will they
are declaratory of the common law doctrine of incorporation by
reference. 58 The Pennsylvania statute sets up alternative conditions of applicability with respect to the requirement of an existing written trust instrument. The statute provides that either a
written trust instrument must be in existence when the will is
executed, or that the trust instrument must be signed by the
settlor if the writing is made at some future time after the execution of the will. The Connecticut statute also allows incorporation
of a trust instrument into a will if in addition to the above prerequisites certain stipulated formalities are observed in the exe-

54 An analogous construction problem is encountered where a settlor reserves a
power to modify the trust and the question arises whether this power includes the power
to revoke. According to Scott " . . . an unrestricted power to modify includes a power
to revoke the trust." 3 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §331.2 (1956).
55 Of course it is always possible to reach the opposite result by making a "statute
in derogation of the common law" argument, and this argument may be especially
strong here where the statute was obviously copied in part from the North Carolina act
which specifically applies to revocable trusts.
56 The term actually employed by these statutes is "made," but it presumably is
synonymous with "executed." But see Berkeley v. Berkeley, [1946] A.C. 555 at 570-571.
Although the decision dealt with construction of the term "provision" in §25 of the
Finance Act of 1941, the question being whether it referred to the language of a will
or the bequest itself, Lord Thankerton discussed a presumption indulged in under
Scottish law that a will is "made" at the time of the testator's death.
57 But even without an express provision to this effect the trust instrument must
be sufficiently identified in the ~\Till to meet the standards of the statute of wills. See note
68 infra.
58 See discussion of the requirements of the common law doctrine, Palmer, p. 39.
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cution of the trust instrument. 59 In Wisconsin the statute merely
requires that the trust be "created by a written instrument." No
provision is made for prior existence of the trust instrument or for
its identification in the will. It could be argued that the Indiana
statute does not require a written trust instrument so long as the
" ... trust or trust fund ... is clearly identified in [the testator's]
will" and" ... is in existence when [the testator's] will is executed."
But the later reference in the statute to "instrument or instruments
governing the trust or trust fund" will probably serve as sufficient
indication that this statute also contemplates a writing.60
The requirement that a written trust instrument must be in
existence at the time the will is executed should be sharply distinguished from the question whether it is necessary that there be
a valid and subsisting trust at this time. The issue is clearly presented by Clark v. Citizens National Bank of Collingswood 61 where
the trust instrument was in existence when the will was executed
but the res of the trust was not delivered to the trustee until after
the execution of the will. The Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, and
Wyoming statutes seem to be satisfied merely by the existence of
the trust instrument when the will is executed, 62 while the North
Carolina and Oregon statutes appear to require the existence of
the trust as well prior to the execution of the will. 63 It is recognized, however, that this interpretation perhaps places too much
emphasis on the use of the word "evidenced" in the Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Wyoming legislation (and the location of
the modifying phrase "written instrument") as compared with "established" as used in the North Carolina and Oregon enactments. 64
59 The trust must be acknowledged by the settlor and witnessed by at least two
persons. The Connecticut statute of wills requires three attesting witnesses. 3 Conn.
Gen. Stat. (1949) §6951.
60 "Unless the will provides otherwise, the property so devised shall be subject -to
the terms and provisions of the instrument or instruments governing the trust or trust
fund even though amended or modified after execution of the will." Emphasis added.
6138 N.J. Super. 69, 118 A. (2d) 108 (1955).
62 The Illinois statute provides that " . . . a testator may devise and bequeath real
and personal estate to a trustee of a trust which is evidenced by a written instrument in
existence when the will is made and which is identified in the will. . . ."
63 The North Carolina statute provides that "A devise or bequest in a will •.. may
be made in form or substance to the trustee of a trust established in writing prior to the
execution of such will."
64 See notes 62 and 63 supra. It could also be argued that the language of the Illinois,
Mississippi, Nebraska, and Wyoming statutes permitting a devise to the "trustee of a
trust which is evidenced by a written instrument in existence when the will is made ..•"
(emphasis added) requires a valid and subsisting ,trust at this time. Even if these statutes
are construed as not requiring the existence of the trust when the will is executed they
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The Pennsylvania statute provides that the trust may be "established" after the execution of the will if the trust instrument is
signed by the settlor, and Connecticut requires only the existence
of the trust instrument prior to the execution of the will. 65 The
Indiana statute stipulates that the trust itself must be in existence
when the will is executed. Wisconsin has taken a different approach and has conferred upon a trust "created by a written instrument" entity status for the purposes of making it "eligible to receive property bequeathed, devised, or appointed." 66 The statute
does not speak on the question whether the trust must be in existence at the time the will is executed, but it would seem that the
general rules applicable to devisees and legatees would control and
that, as with any other entity eligible to receive property by will,
a trust need not be in existence when the will is executed in order
to be capable of receiving property under the will at the testator's
death. 67
The conclusions reached with respect to the provisions of
these statutes concerning the requirements of a trust instrument,
in existence, and identified in the will are summarized below:
(1) Each of these elements is a statutory prerequisite in Connecticut, Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Wyoming. The North
Carolina and Oregon statutes require a writing in existence; although they do not expressly provide for its identification in the
will, some means of identification must of course be contained
in the language of the will. 68
(2) Pennsylvania requires a writing, but it need not be in
existence at the time the will is executed if signed by the settlor.
If it is in existence at the time the will is executed it need not be
signed. No express provision is made by the Pennsylvania statute
for identification of the writing in the will.

still may be construed to require its existence at the testator's death. See discussion of
these· statutes in text infra relating to revocation of the trust. The Mississippi and Nebraska
statutes expressly provide that revocation prior to the testator's death revokes the bequest.
65 The Connecticut statute provides that the "document creating . . . [the] trust"
be in existence when the will is executed. Although this language is probably merely
descriptive of •the nature of the document, it might be argued that the statute requires
the existence of the trust itself at this time.
66 No provision is made in the Wisconsin statute for identification of the trust in the
will. However, like every other devisee or legatee it must be sufficiently identifiable to
meet the standards of the statute of wills. See 2 JARMAN, WILLS, 8th ed., 1233, 1234 (1951).
67 See 1 JARMAN, WILLS, 8th ed., 108, 116 (1951); 3 id., 1689-1697.
6SSee 2 id., 1233-1246.
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(3) In Wisconsin a writing is required. The statute makes no
provision with respect to identification of the trust instrument in
the will and does not require that it be in existence when the
will is executed. The Indiana statute will probably also be con:strued to require a written trust instrument, and in this connection
the requirements that the writing be in existence at the time the
will is executed and that it be identified in the will may also b~
read into the statute.
The interpretations made of the different statutes with respect
to the requirement that the trust itself be in existence when the
will is executed may be summarized as follows:
(I) The Connecticut and Wisconsin statutes do not require
that the trust be in existence when the will is executed. The provisions of the Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Wyoming statutes
are less clear, but will probably be similarly construed.
(2) The existence of a valid trust when the will is executed i~
a prerequisite to the application of the Indiana, North Carolina,
and Oregon statutes.
(3) Under the Pennsylvania statute the trust need not be in
existence when the will is executed if the trust instrument is signed
by the settlor.
If the above statutory interpretations are correct the bequest
in Clark v. Citizens National Bank of Collingswood 69 would be
upheld under the Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming statutes, as the trust instrument was in existence when
the will was executed. It would be invalid under the Pennsylvania
statute unless the trust instrument was signed by the settlor, and
invalid under the Connecticut statute because the trust instrument
was not witnessed or acknowledged. The bequest would fail under
the Indiana, North Carolina, and Oregon statutes because the trust
was not in existence when the will was executed.
Where the bequest would be invalid under statute the further
problem remains whether it could be upheld at common law. In
other words, the question becomes: do the statutes displace common law rules, or do they merely constitute other means for upholding a bequest to the corpus of an inter vivas trust in addition
to those existing at common law? The common law doctrine of
incorporation by reference, for example, demands only the existence of the trust instrument, not the trust itself, prior to the ex69

38 N.J. Super. 69, 118 A. (2d) 108 (1955).
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ecution of the will. The initial question with which a court faced
with a problem of this type would be confronted is whether the
statute is indicative of a legislative intent to preempt the entire
field. 70 A finding that the statute abolished all the common law
-rules pertaining to incorporation by reference of an instrument
creating an inter vivos trust is unlikely in view of the obvious
purpose of the legislation to facilitate the upholding of such
bequests. The next question is whether the particular common
law rule under consideration has been changed by the statute.
The North Carolina statute, for example, provides that "A devise
or bequest in a will ... may be made in form or substance to the
trustee of a trust established in writing prior to the execution of
such will." The critical language is "may be." Does this mean
"may only be"? The legislative purpose to liberalize the common
law rule and the fact that imperative language was not employed
make probable a finding that the common law doctrine of incorporation by reference was not affected by the statute.
C. Effect of an Amendment of th"e Trust Subsequent to the
Execution of the Will. Under the Connecticut statute the bequest
is invalidated if the trust is amended subsequent to the execution
of the will or codicil in which it is made, but it can be reinstated
by republication in a later codicil to the will. The language of the
Oregon statute declaring that a bequest to an inter vivos trust
· shall not be invalid ". . . provided that the will or the last codicil
thereto vyas executed subsequent to the time of execution of the
trust instrument and all amendments thereto" seems to imply that
the bequest is void where the trust is amended after execution of
the will or last codicil.71 Under this construction the net effect of
these two statutes is merely to allow a testator to make a bequest
to the corpus of an amendable inter vivos trust without repeating
the terms of the trust in the will. Any modification of the trust
provisions must be carried out in conjunction with a re-execution
of the will or execution of codicil thereto or else the bequest is to

70 This, of course, must assume that the jurisdiction in question has accepted the
common law doctrine of incorporation by reference.
71 In support of a more liberal construction of the Oregon statute it could be argued
that all that is affirmatively required is that a bequest to an inter vivos trust shall not
be held invalid if the will -was executed following all trust amendments, that it does
not establish any rule of law with respect to trusts which have been amended after execution of the will, and that the courts are left free to establish their own rules for such
cases. If this was really the legislative intent, however, the statute is poorly drafted.
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be void. 72 Both statutes require that the bequest be held invalid if
the will is not re-executed after amendment of the trust even
though the trust amendment was minor with respect to the overall
dispositive scheme. Further, although it should be possible to
avoid this construction, strict adherence to the statutory language
would require invalidity of the bequest if the will is not republished after trust amendments even where the testator has expressly
disclaimed in his will an intent to include later amendments to the
trust. 73 However, where the settlor of the trust is someone other
than the testator or where a power of amendment is vested in some
other person, there is little doubt that the courts will depart from
the literal meaning of these statutes rather than read them as
requiring that the bequest be held invalid if the trust is amended
after the death of the testator. 74
If an amendment is made in writing after the execution of the
will and before the death of the testator, the willed property passes

72 The Connecticut statute does allow "addition to or withdrawal of any or all assets
from said trust or a change of the trustee or trustees of such trust ..•" without requiring re-execution of the will. Compare the provisions of this statute with the decision in
In re Ivie's Will, note 47 supra, where the court recognized that amendments to the
trust made after the execution of the will but which concerned only the administration
of the trust did not invalidate the bequest.
73 The Connecticut statute stipulates that "if such trust by its terms may be . . .
amended, such devise or bequest shall be deemed invalid, if, subsequent to the execution
of such will or codicil, the trust is ••. amended . . . ,'' and the Oregon statute that
"Such devise or bequest shall not be invalid because the trust is amendable by the
settlor or any other person or persons, provided that the will or the last codicil thereto
was executed subsequent to the time of execution of the trust instrument and all amendments thereto." It seems doubtful that these statutes were meant to apply to situations
where the testator did not intend amendments to the trust made after his will was executed
to affect the dispositive provisions of his will. The legislative purpose was to liberalize
,the common law rules in order to facilitate the upholding of bequests made to the corpus
of an inter vivos trust, not to add new barriers to those already existing. In most common
law jurisdictions a bequest of this type would be upheld.
74 See the language of the statutes in note 73 supra. It is doubtful that the
courts will construe them as requiring invalidity of the bequest where amendments to
the trust are made after the ,testator's death even though neither statute expressly provides
a cut-off time for the operation of the provisions invalidating the bequest because of
amendments made after the execution of the will. See in this respect the terms of the
Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Wyoming statutes establishing the
death of the testator as the last point of time at which trust amendments are to have
any effect upon the testator's will. An analogous principle that the validity of the bequest
is to be tested as of ,the time of the death of the testator will probably be read into the
Connecticut and Oregon statutes as it is unlikely that either legislature was concerned
with the effect of trust amendments made after the testator's death. The limitations
imposed upon the amount of discretion which the trustee or some other person may
exercise in relation to the trust after the death of the testator is more properly a matter
for the law of trusts rather than the law of wills. See 1 JARMAN, 'WILLS, 8th ed., 496-497
(1951).
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in accordance with the terms of the amended trust under the
Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Wyoming
statutes unless the will provides otherwise. By implication it is
possible to argue that amendments to the trust made after the
death of the testator are not effective with respect to the willed
property. 75
The Indiana and Pennsylvania statutes require that unless it
is otherwise provided in the will the property disposed of under
the will shall pass in accordance with the terms of the trust as
amended. Where a power to amend is vested in some person other
than the testator these statutes are broad enough to allow amendments to the trust relating to the willed property and made after
the death of the testator to be given effect.76
The Wisconsin statute provides that an amendment of the
trust made after the execution of the will is effective to change
the dispositive provisions of the will with respect to property
passing to the trust at the testator's death, and like the Indiana and
Pennsylvania legislation it is broad enough to comprehend amendments made by some person other than the testator after his
death. 77
The problem deserving special consideration is raised by the
75 The wording of the North Carolina statute, "Unless the will provides otherwise,
such devise or bequest shall operate to dispose of property under the terms of the trust
as they appear in writing at the testator's death ... ," however, makes this construction
unlikely, as it is possible to contend with some force that the legislature was concerned
only with ,the effect of a bequest up to the time of the testator's death and that there
was no intent to legislate with respect to trust amendments made after the testator's death.
And even if the statute does apply to amendments made after the testator's death a
power to amend the trust held by some person other than the testator should be exercisable with respect to the ,'villed property if such power was reserved "under ,the terms
of the trust as they appear in writing at the testator's death." These same arguments are
more difficult to make under the provisions of ,the Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, and
Wyoming statutes which read: "Unless the will provides othenvise the estate so devised
and bequeathed shall be governed by the terms and provisions of the instrument creating
the trust including any amendments or modifications in writing made at any time before
or after the making of the will and before the death of the testator." (Emphasis added.)
It might also be argued •that these statutes allow the .testator to stipulate in his will that
trust amendments made after his death are to be given effect.
76 The operative provisions of both these statutes allow later amendments to be given
effect and no cut-off time is established by the statutes limiting the application of these
provisions. Compare note 75 supra. Under the Pennsylvania statute an amendment to
a trust established after the execution of the testator's will must be signed by the settlor.
However, the settlor may be some person other than the testator.
77 See note 76 supra. It could be argued, however, that the provisions of the Wisconsin
statute sub. (6) stipulating that amendments of the trust made after •the execution of the
will are effective to change the disposition of the willed property "even though the will
is not re-executed or republished" contemplates the continued existence of the testator
and therefore applies only to amendments made during his lifetime.
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terms of the will in In re Snyder's Will 18 which provided ". . I
do not intend to incorporate in this my Last Will and Testament
any future amendments which I may make to said Agreement [the
inter vivos trust]." Suppose that after such a will is executed
amendments are made to the trust. As observed above, unless the
will is re-executed the bequest could be held invalid under the
Connecticut and Oregon statutes. But if the will is republished or
if these statutes are held not to apply to trusts where the later
amendments subsequent to the trust amendments are not intended
to affect the will, the testator's intent that his will should exclude
the later trust amendments will be carried out.79 Similarly the later
amendments will be excluded under the Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming statutes.80 The Wisconsin statute, however, contains the affirmative
stipulation that a trust amendment "shall be effective" to alter the
provisions of the will, which would seem to require that the terms
of the trust are to control in every case. 81 Where the testator indicates at the time he amends the trust that he has changed his mind
and now intends the willed property to pass in accordance with the
terms of the amended trust this legislation perhaps serves the useful purpose of giving effect to the most recent expression of the
testator's intent, but it is difficult to see any justification for requiring the terms of the trust as amended to control when this would
be contrary to the testator's intention. This provision of the Wisconsin statute will undoubtedly serve as another pitfall for the unwary in this area.
D. Effect of a Revocation of the Trust Subsequent to the Execution of the Will. The discussion of these statutes relating to the effect of revocation of the inter vivos trust could be in part re1s 125 N.Y.S. (2d) 459 at 460 (1953).
79 Both statutes are phrased in negative terms, i.e., in Connecticut "No devise or
bequest given in any will or codicil or republication thereof in any codicil shall be deemed
invalid by reason of any reference therein to any document creating a trust .• .'' and
in Oregon "Such devise or bequest shall not be invalid because the trust is amendable by
the settlor or any other person or persons .•." leaving the courts free to carry out the
testator's intent to exclude later amendments. Compare discussion of the Wisconsin statute
in the text infra.
so All these statutes make express provision for the situation where the testator
intends to exclude later amendments ·to the trust by stipulating that amendments made
after the will may be given effect "unless the will provides otherwise."
81 It should be noted that an ambiguity exists in the Wisconsin statute -because of
the provision in sub. (2) that a trust shall be eligible to receive property bequeathed or
devised by the "settlor and others" and the use of the term "settlor's" will in sub. (3).
"Settlor's" in sub. (3) will probably be read as "testator's."
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phrased in terms of the question whether there need be a valid
trust in existence at the death of the testator. In this latter form it
is clear that this question must be related to the question treated
above regarding whether there need be a valid trust in existence
when the will is executed.
The Mississippi, Nebraska, and North Carolina statutes provide that a revocation of the trust prior to the testator's death invalidates the bequest. 82 The same result is required by the Pennsylvania statute "unless the will directs otherwise." 83 The Connecticut
act does not differentiate between revocations prior or subsequent
to the testator's death; and, although it probably will not be so
construed with respect to the latter, a literal reading of the statutory language would demand invalidation of a bequest to any trust
which had been revoked after execution of the will. 84
The Illinois, Indiana, and Wyoming statutes do not expressly
spell out what effect a later revocation of the trust is to have on the
will. The first sentence of the Illinois and Wyoming statutes allows
a bequest to be made to the trustee of a trust "even though the
trust is subject to amendment, modification, revocation or termination." The second sentence of these statutes states: "Unless the
will provides otherwise the estate so devised and bequeathed shall
be governed by the terms and provisions of the instrument creating
the trust including any amendments or modifications ... made ...
before the death of the testator." The most probable inference

82 "An entire revocation of the trust prior -to the testator's death shall invalidate
the devise or bequest." Under the terms of these statutes the bequest fails upon revocation
of -the trust even though the testator stipulates in his will that such revocation is to have
no effect upon the property passing at death. See discussion in text supra on the effect
of an amendment to the trust where the testator does not intend it to affect the terms
of .his will, and see In re Snyder's Will, 125 N.Y.S. (2d) 459 (1953).
83 In declaring that a revocation of the trust "shall invalidate the devise or bequest"
the Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania statutes all include the
modifying phrase "prior to the testator's death." One inference which might be drawn
from the use of the imperative "shall" is that the validity of the bequest shall not be
affected by a revocation made after the testator's death, but a more probable construction
of the statutes is that they leave untouched the common law rules relating to such revocations. See discussion in text supra with respect to these statutes regarding amendments
to the trust made after the death of the testator.
84 "No devise or bequest given in any will or codicil or republication thereof in any
codicil shall be deemed invalid ,by reason of any reference therein to any document creating a trust • . . provided, if such trust by its ,terIDS may be revoked • • . such devise or
bequest shall be deemed invalid, if, subsequent to the execution of such will or codicil,
the trust is revoked. . . ." See discussion in text supra with respect to the Connecticut
statute regarding amendments to the trust made after the death of the testator, and
see note 74 supra.
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from the legislatures' use of the term "revocation" in the first
sentence and its omission from the second sentence is that they did
not intend to change the common law rule governing the effect
of a revocation of the trust prior to the testator's death. 85 At common law a revocation of the entire trust prior to the death of the
testator would probably cause the bequest to fail. 86 Revocation of
the trust after the testator's death is a matter dealt with by the
law of trusts, not the law of wills. 87 If the term "modified" in the
Indiana statute is construed to include trusts which are "revoked"
after the will is executed, the language providing that the property
devised "shall be subject to the terms ... of the ... instruments
governing the trust" requires that a revocation prior to the testator's death cause invalidity of the bequest.88 The operation of the
Indiana statute under this construction with respect to a revocation
occurring after the testator's death is not clear. If a bequest to a
revocable trust is upheld at common law it would seem that upon
the death of the testator the property added to the trust should be
treated in the same manner as the rest of the trust corpus. There is
no special virtue to a testamentary addition to a trust corpus as
compared with property placed in the trust during the lifetime of
the testator. A later revocation of the trust has no relation- whatsoever to the validity of the bequest, and the disposition of the trust
corpus after revocation depends upon the law of trusts, not the law
of wills.89 It is unlikely that the legislature intended to change the
85 It might also be argued, however, that the omission of "revocation" from the
second sentence of these statutes is indicative of an affirmative legislative intent that tlie
estate bequeathed shall not be governed by revocations before the death of the testator.
Compare note 75 supra. It is even less likely that the legislature intended to deal with
the effect of a revocation of the trust after the testator's death. Compare note 74 supra,
but see discussion in the text supra concerning the statutory prerequisites for applicability
where the possibility of legislative preemption is considered.
86 Palmer concludes that the common law effect of the revocation of an inter vivos
trust prior to the death of the testator should depend upon the testator's intent when
he executes his will, and cites Fifth Third Union Trust Co. v. Wilensky, 79 Ohio App.
73, 70 N.E. (2d) 920 (1946), in support of this proposition. Palmer, p. 65. It would seem,
however, that those courts which hold that amendments to the trust after the will is
executed cause the bequest to fail will treat revocations similarly. See notes 44 and 45
supra. There is almost no authority directly on point.
87 See note 85 supra and see discussion in the text infra on ,the common law effect of
a revocation of the trust after the testator's death.
ss "Unless the will provides otherwise, the property so devised shall be subject to
the terms and provisions of the •.. instruments governing the trust ... even though ..•
modified after execution of the will."
89 The testator may, of course, make provision in his will for the disposition of the
property bequeathed to the trust in the event of its revocation after -his death, or such
provision may be made in the trust itself. In the absence of stipulations to the contrary,
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common law rules governing revocation, after the death of the
testator, of trusts to which bequests have been made,90 but on the
postulated construction that the statute does not differentiate between revocations prior to and after the testator's death, and if
those prior to his death cause invalidity it could be argued that
those subsequent to it should have the same effect. If the above constru_ction of the term "modified" in the Indiana statute is rejected
the common law rule still prevails both as to revocations of the
trust prior to and after the testator's death. 91
As pointed out above there is some doubt whether the Oregon
statute even applies to trusts where a power of revocation is reserv~d.92 If the term "amendment" in the Oregon statute is construed to include "revocation" then revocation of the trust would
cause invalidity of the bequest whether or not the "will or last
codicil thereto" was executed subsequent to such revocation. 93 If
the statuto_ry rule does not apply either by construction or analogy
tq situations involving_ revocation of the trust then the common
law rule is still in force and revocation prior to the testator's death
probably will cause the bequest to fail. 94
Th(Wisc~nsin statute, subsection (3), provides that "any or
all of the pow~rs listed in subsection (1) may be exercised without
aff~ctJng the validity of the trust, ... and its independent existence
and eligibility for the receipt of property ..." by will. Among the

a revocation of the trust after the testator's death would give rise to a resulting trust in
favor of the settlor or his heirs and this resulting trust would embrace both the property
originally 'placed in the trust fund and the property which passed to it at the testator's
death. In some jurisdictions the property passing to the trust by will would be administer~d as a sep~rate testamentary trust. See note 101 infra.
90 Compare notes 74·and 75 supra, and see discussion in the text supra dealing with
the statutory prerequisites for applicability regarding the purpose for which these statutes
were enacted'.' and their possible effect upon the existing common law rules.
91 See note 86 supra regarding the common law effect of revocations prior to the
testator's death. It should be pointed out, however, that the Indiana statute is couched
in affirmative language, i.e., "such devise shall -be valid and effective." If the term
"modified" in the second sentence does not apply to revocations it could be argued
that a revocation of the trust after execution of the will does not affect the bequest.
92Notes 54 and 55 supra.
93 "Such· devise or bequest shall not be invalid . . . provided that the will or last
codicil thereto was executed subsequent to the time of execution of the trust instrument
and all amendments thereto." If the will or last codicil was executed after the revocation
of the trust the revocation would be given effect and the bequest would fail; if not
executed subsequent to the revocation of ,the trust the bequest would be invalid under
the provisions of the statute.
94 See note 86 supra. As to the common law rule governing the effect of revocations
of the trust after the death of the testator, see notes 87 and 89 supra.
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powers listed in subsection (I) is the power to revoke. This portion
of the statute therefore seems to indicate that the trust may be
revoked and still be eligible to receive the bequest. Subsection (3)
further provides that " ... the exercise of a power under subsection (l)(a) to amend, alter or modify the provisions of the [trust]
instrument shall be effective to change such provisions as to the
property devised, bequeathed or appointed by will ... ," the implication being that the exercise of the power to revoke, also listed
in subsection (l)(a) need not be given this effect. (It should be
observed that this latter provision is phrased in the imperative,
not the permissive form.) The import of these two provisions taken
together seems to be that the effect of a revocation of the trust on
the validity of the bequest depends upon the intent of the testator.95 If he intends the revocation to cause the bequest to fail, this
intent will be carried out; if he intends the revocation to have
no effect on the bequest, the bequest will be upheld. It is recognized, however, that this construction is inconsistent with the
general overall approach of the Wisconsin statute in treating the
trust as an entity.00
·
Only the Pennsylvania statute expressly makes provision for
the situation where the testator intends the property owned at
death to pass under the terms of the trust even though it is subsequently revoked.9'l. The- Wisconsin statute will probably be interpreted to reach the same result, and the Indiana statute can be
construed in a similar fashion by reading the language referring to
trusts which have been "modified" after execution of the will as
applicable to revocations or, along with the Illinois and Wyoming
statutes, by a finding that the common law rules dealing with the
effect of a revocation of the trust are still in force.
E. Statutory Provisions Relating to the Trust. (1) Established
by the testator v. ·established by persons other· than the testator.
In considering the applicability of the statutes to bequests to trusts
generally it has been tacitly assumed up to now that a bequest

95 It might also be argued that the failure to include the power to revoke among
the powers listed in the latter clause of sub. (3) implies that the exercise of the power
to revoke shall not "be effective to change such provisions as to property devised, bequeathed or appointed by will," or in other words that a bequest cannot be revoked
by revocation of the trust. Compare notes 83 and 85 supra.
96 Without stipulations to the contrary in the will a bequest to an entity not in
existence at the death of the testator will lapse. See I JARMAN, WILLS, 8th ed., 438 (1951).
97 "An entire revocation of the trust prior to the testator's death shall invalidate the
devise or bequest unless the will directs otherwise." Emphasis added.
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could be made by the testator either to a trust established by himself or by some other person. Such an assumption is warranted by
the express provisions of the Pennsylvania and Wisconsin statutes.98 The Connecticut statute applies only to bequests to inter
vivos trusts established by the testator, his or her spouse, or a
parent or child of the testator.99
The statutes of Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, North
Carolina, Oregon, and Wyoming are all broad enough to read
upon trusts established by persons other than the testator, and
doubtless will be so construed by the courts.100
(2) Testamentary trust v. inter vivos trust. Some courts have
indicated that the common law doctrine of incorporation by
reference requires that the property passing by will to the trustee
of an inter vivos trust be placed in a separate testamentary trust
rather than added to the corpus of the inter vivos trust. 101 The
Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania statutes
stipulate that unless the will provides otherwise the property
"shall not be deemed held under a testamentary trust." 102 The
Wisconsin and Connecticut statutes contain language of similar
import,103 but in the latter state the property passing by will "shall
be administered as a testamentary trust" if any trustee· resides or
has its principal place of business outside of Connecticut.
The statutes of Illinois, Indiana, Oregon, and Wyoming make
no provision with respect to this problem.
(3) Existence of the trust at the testator's death. The question
whether the trust need be in existence at the death of the testator,
98 The Pennsylvania statute provides that the trust may be established " ••. by
the testator or any other person . . ." and the Wisconsin statute declares that the trust
shall -be eligible to receive property from ". . _. the settlor and others. . • ."
99 The Connecticut statute provides that the document creating the trust must be
executed .by " . . . the testator, his or iher spouse, or a parent or child of such testator
as settlor of such trust. . . ."
100 But see Commissioner's comment on the Indiana statute to the effect that it is
limited to public charitable trusts. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1953) §6.601(j).
lOlSee Montgomery v. Blankenship, 217 Ark. 357, 239 S.W. (2d) 758 (1950), and
dictum in fa re York's Estate, 95 N.H. 435 at 436, 65 A. (2d) 282 (1949). But see 1 Scorr,
TRusrs, 2d ed., §54.3, p. 382 (1956).
102 The Nebraska statute provides ,that the trust will be deemed nontestamentary
only if " . . . the designated trustee is a corporate trustee authorized by law to act as
an executor or administrator."
103 The Wisconsin statute provides in sub. (2) that "No reference ,to any such trust
in any will shall cause the trust assets to be included in the property administered as
part of the testator's estate" and in sub. (3) that "Any or all of the powers listed in sub.
(I) may be exercised without affecting the validity of the trust, its non-testamentary
character...•"
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i.e., whether the validity of the bequest is dependent upon the
existence of at least a nominal trust corpus at his death, might
well have been taken up in conjunction with the prerequisites for
applicability of the statutes.104 It obviously must also be correlated
with the problems associated with revocation of the trust prior
to the testator's death. The Wisconsin statute provides that a
trust shall be eligible to receive property by will ". . . whatever
the size or character of its corpus. . . ." Although this language
arguably contemplates the existence of some corpus, nominal or
otherwise, at the testator's death, it probably will be construed to
require no corpus at all. The operation of the Connecticut statute
which stipulates that " ... mere addition to or withdrawal of any
or all assets from said trust ... " will not cause invalidity of the bequest is also independent of the size of the trust corpus at the
testator's death, although it may be contended that a nominal
corpus is required at the time the will is executed.105 No reference
is made to the size of the trust corpus in any of the other statutes,
and thus the existence of a nominal corpus at the testator's death,
though perhaps not required by all, will suffice to satisfy the
provisions of any of them. 106
As pointed out above, the Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania statutes expressly provide that a revocation
of the trust prior to the testator's death invalidates the bequest.107
Therefore, insofar as a withdrawal of the entire corpus of the
trust may be held to constitute a revocation, these statutes require
the existence of at least a nominal corpus at the death of the
testator.108 Similarly with respect to the Indiana, Illinois, and
Wyoming statutes, under which it was concluded that the common

104 See discussion in text supra concerning the requirement that the trust be in
existence when the will is executed.
105 See note 65 supra.
100 Some writers are of the opinion that a nominal corpus will not suffice to sustain
a bequest to an inter vivos trust under the common law doctrine of independent significance. See I Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §54.3, p. 382 (1956). It has been suggested that some
of these statutes may be considered by the courts to be enactments of the independent
significance doctrine. See 69 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1147 (1956). See also Palmer, p. 69 ,criticizing
the requirement of a specific minimum trust corpus.
107 Note 82 supra. The Pennsylvania statute allows the testator to avoid this result
by providing otherwise in his will.
10s No doubt a withdrawal of the entire trust corpus terminates the trust, but Professor Scott is of the opinion that such a withdrawal does not necessarily bring to an end
fiduciary relationships which existed by virtue of the trust. See I Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed.,
§74.2 (1956). In other words, termination by withdrawal may not be the equivalent of
termination by revocation, and <the statutes make specific reference only to the latter.
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law rules relating to revocation of the trust prior to the testator's
death may still be in force, if a withdrawal of all the trust assets
constitutes a revocation then a nominal corpus may be required. 109

Conclusions
Although there are significant differences in both statute and
case law in the various jurisdictions, a few generalizations with
respect to the overall status of the problems relating to testamentary additions to the corpus of an inter vivos trust are possible:
(I) The current trend of both judicial and legislative developments is toward a more liberal attitude in upholding such
transactions.
(2) There have apparently been no decisions handed down
since 1951 in which the court has struck down a bequest because
it was made to an amendable or revocable trust; and the existing
statutes all provide that a bequest shall not be invalid because of
the mere reservation of a power to alter the trust terms.
(3) Where the trust has been modified after the execution of
the will no court without the aid of statute has expressed a willingness to give effect to the bequest in the amended form. From the
dicta in the cases, opinion appears to be split on the question
whether such a bequest should be declared totally invalid or should
be upheld in accordance with the terms of the trust when the will
was executed. In general the statutes have adopted a more liberal
approach, and the majority of them allow the willed property to
pass by the terms of the amended trust, even where the amendment has no independent significance and relates only to the estate
owned at death.
(4) The provisions of a number of the statutes are apparently
satisfied by the existence of the trust instrument prior to the execution of the will and do not require that the trust itself be in
existence at this time, although several of the statutes are unclear
on this point. No statute imposes a minimum on the amount of
property which must be placed in the corpus of the inter vivos
trust during the life of the testator except as they may be read to
require the existence of the trust itself when the will is executed,
though some of them may be construed to require at least a nominal trust corpus at his death.
109 Revocation at common law may not cause invalidity of the entire bequest. See
note 86 supra.
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(5) Some of the shortcomings of the existing statutes in this area
would include a failure expressly to distinguish between amendments and revocations prior to and after the testator's death, a
lack of clarity with respect to the question whether the trust itself
must be in existence when the will is executed or at the testator's
death, and the fact that no stipulation is made of their intended
effect on the pre-existing common law rules dealing with the
doctrines of independent significance and incorporation by
reference.
Richard I. Singer, S.Ed.

APPENDIX
CONNECTICUT

[Conn. Pub. Acts, Jan. Sess. 1957, P.A. No. 575]
Section 2929d of the 1955 supplement to the general statutes is repealed and the fol•
lowing is substituted in lieu ,thereof: No devise or bequest given in any will or codicil
or republication thereof in any codicil shall be deemed invalid by reason of any reference
therein to any document creating a trust, which document was executed and acknowledged
by the testator, his or her spouse, or a parent or child of such testator as settlor of such
trust and witnessed by at least two persons and was in existence at the time of the execution of such will or codicil and is identified in such will or codicil by reference to
the names of the parties who executed such document and the date of such execution,
and such a devise or bequest may be made to the trustee or trustees of such trust;
provided, if such trust by its terms may be revoked or amended, such devise or bequest
shall be deemed invalid, if, subsequent to the execution of such will or codicil, the trust
is revoked or amended, provided mere addition to or withdrawal of any or all assets
from said trust or a change of the trustee or trustees of such trust, if such substitute
trustee or trustees be a corporate trustee authorized to act as such within this state and
such amendment is in accordance with the terms thereof, shall not be deemed a revocation or amendment within the meaning of the provisions hereof. Such reference in a
will or codicil to such trust document by which a devise or ,bequest is made to such
trust shall not thereby cause such trust or such part of the assets thereof distributed to
it by such devise or bequest to be subject to the jurisdiction of the probate court in
which such will or codicil is admitted to probate unless any trustee thereof resides or
has its principal place of business outside of the state, in which· event the provisions of
such document of trust, if all other provisions of this section have been complied with,
shall be deemed incorporated in such will or codicil, and such bequest or devise shall
be administered as a testamentary trust under the continuing jurisdiction of the probate
court in which such will or codicil is admitted to probate.
lu.INOIS

[Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 3, §194a]
By a will signed and attested as provided in this Act a testator may devise and bequeath real and personal estate to a trustee of a trust which is evidenced by a written
instrument in existence when the will is made and which is identified in the will, even
though the trust is subject to amendment, modification, revocation or termination. Unless
the will provides othenvise the estate so devised and bequeathed shall be governed by
the terms and provisions of the instrument creating the trust including any amendments
or modifications in writing made at any time before or after the making of the will and
before the death of the testator.
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INDIANA

[Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1953 rep!.) §6-6010)]
If a testator devises real or personal property to be added to a trust or trust fund
which is clearly identified in his will and which is in existence when his will is executed,
such devise shall be valid and effective. Unless the will provides otherwise, the property
so devised shall be subject to the terms and provisions of the instrument or instruments
governing the trust or trust fund even though amended or modified after execution
of the will.
MISSISSIPPI

[Senate Bill No. 1928, approved, May 6, 1958]
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Mississippi;
Section I. That a devise or bequest in a will duly executed pursuant to the provisions
of Section 657 of Mississippi Code of 1942 may ,be made to the trustee of a trust which
is evidenced by a written instrument in existence when the will is made and which is
identified in the will. Such devise or ·bequest shall not be invalid because the trust is
amendable or revocable or both by the settler or any other person or persons; nor because
the trust instrument or any amendment thereto was not executed in the manner required
for wills; nor because the trust was amended after execution of the will. Unless the will
provides otherwise, such devise or bequest shall operate to dispose of the property under
the terms and provisions of the instrument creating the trust including any amendments
or modifications in writing made at any time before or after the making of the will and
before the death of the testator, and the property shall not be deemed held under a
testamentary· trust. An entire revocation of the trust prior to the testator's death shall
invalidate the devise or bequest.
Section 2. That the provisions of this Act shall apply to all devises or bequests made
in any will duly executed according to Section 657 of the Mississippi Code of 1942, of
any testator dying after the effective date of this Act, whether the will is executed before
or after the effective date of this Act.
Section 3. That the term "will" in this Act shall include and refer to the term
"codicil."
Section 4. That this Act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.
NEBRASKA

[Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943; Cum. Supp. 1957) §30-1806]
A -testator may by will, devise and bequeath real and personal property to a trustee
of a trust which is evidenced by a written instrument in existence when the will is made
and which is identified in the will, even though the trust is subject to amendment, modification, revocation, or termination. Unless the will provides otherwise, the estate so devised
and bequeathed shall be governed by the terms and provisions of the instrument creating
the trust, including any amendments or modifications in writing made at any time before
or after the making of the will and before the death of the testator. Unless the will
provides otherwise, the property so devised and bequeathed shall not be deemed held
under a testamentary trust if the designated trustee is a corporate trustee authorized by
law to act as an executor or administrator. An entire revocation of the trust prior to the
testator's death shall invalidate the devise or bequest.
NORTH CAROLINA

[N.C. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1957) §31-47]
A devise or bequest in a will duly executed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter
may be made in form or substance to the trustee of a trust established in writing prior
to the execution of such will. Such devise or bequest shall not be invalid because the
trust is amendable or revocable or both by the settlor or any other person or persons;
nor because the trust instrument or any amendment thereto was not executed in the
manner required for wills; nor because the trust was amended after execution of the
will. Unless the will provides otherwise, such devise or bequest shall operate to dispose
of property under the terms of the trust as they appear in writing at the testator's death
and the property shall not be deemed held under a testamentary trust. An entire revocation of the trust prior to the -testator's death shall invalidate the devise or bequest.
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OREGON

[Ore. Rev. Stat. (1957) §114.070)
Section I. A devise or bequest in a will duly executed pursuant to the provisions of
this chapter may be made in form or substance to the trustee of a trust in existence at
the date of the testator's death and established by written instrument executed prior
to the execution of such will. Such devise or bequest shall not be invalid because the
trust is amendable by the settlor or any other person or persons, provided that the will
or the last codicil thereto was executed subsequent to the time of execution of the trust
instrument and all amendments thereto.
PENNSYLVANIA

(Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1957) tit. 20, §180.141]
A devise or bequest in a will may be made to the trustee of a trust (including an
unfunded life insurance trust, although the settlor has reserved any or all rights of ownership in the insurance contracts) established, in writing, by the testator or any other person
before or concurrently with the execution of such will or to such a trust to be established,
in writing, at a future date: Provided, That any such future trust instrument or amendment thereto shall be signed by the settlor. Such devise or bequest shall not be invalid
because the trust was amended after execution of the will. Unless the will provides
otherwise, the property so devised or bequeathed shall not ,be deemed held under a
testamentary trust of the testator but shall become and be a part of the principal of the
trust to which it is given to be administered and disposed of in accordance with the
provisions of the instrument establishing such trust and any amendment thereof. An entire
revocation of the trust prior to the testator's death shall invalidate the devise or bequest
unless the will directs otherwise.
WISCONSIN

[Wis. Stat. (1957) §231.205)
(1) Any instrument declaring or creating a trust, when othenvise valid, shall not be
held an invalid trust, or an attempted testamentary disposition, because it contains any
of the following powers, whether exercisable by the settlor or another or both:
(a) To revoke, alter, amend or modify any or all provisions of the trust.
(b) To exercise any power or option over any property transferred to or held in the
trust.
(c} To add to or withdraw from the trust all or any part thereof at one time or at
different times.
(d) To direct during the lifetime of the settlor or another, the persons and organizations to whom or on ,behalf of whom the income shall be paid or principal distributed.
(2) A trust otherwise valid, created by a written instrument, whether or not it contains
any or all of the powers specified in sub. (1), shall have existence independent of any
will and be eligible to receive property bequeathed, devised or appointed by the settlor
and others, whatever the size or character of its corpus or the terms of the instrument,
unless the instrument specifically states otherwise. No reference to any such trust in any
will shall cause the trust assets to be included in the property administered as part of
the testator's estate.
(3) Any or all of the powers listed in sub. (1) may be exercised without affecting the
validity of the trust, its nontestamentary character and its independent existence and
eligibility for the receipt of property bequeathed, devised and appointed to it, and the
exercise of a power, under sub. (l)(a) to amend, alter or modify the provisions of the
instrument shall be effective to change such provisions as to property devised, bequeathed
or appointed by will to the trust even though the settlor's will is not re-executed or
republished after the exercise of such power.

•

•

•

•

•

(6) Any amendment, alteration or modification of a trust subject to this section shall
be effective to change the provisions thereof as to property devised, bequeathed or appointed by will to the trust even though the will is not re-executed or republished after
the effective date of the amendment, alteration or modification, if the settlor or testator
is alive on or after July 26, 1957.
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WYOMING

[Wyo. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1957) §6-310]
1. By a will signed and attested as provided in this Act a testator may devise and
bequeath real and personal estate to a trustee of a trust which is evidenced by a written
instrument in existence when the will is made and which is identified in the will, even
though the trust is subject to amendment, modification, revocation or termination. Unless
the will provides otherwise the estate so devised and bequeathed shall be governed by
the terms and provisions of the instrument creating the trust including any amendments
or modifications in writing made at any time before or after the making of the will and
before the death of the testator.

